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Abstract We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well non-
preemption duopoly competition, on the timing of investments in two complementary inputs,
where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that
the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior.
When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist
firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the
conventional wisdom (i.e., synchronous investments are more likely), whereas, the follower’s
behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are
more likely).
Keywords Complementary investments · Duopoly · Investment analysis · Non-preemption ·
Real option game · Uncertainty
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1 Introduction
Sometimes it pays to put the (new) cart before the (new) horse. Conventional wisdom says
that “when a production process requires two extremely complementary inputs, a firm should
upgrade (or replace) them simultaneously”.1 When raising the quality of one input, a firm
should upgrade its complement at the same time. These guidelines are corroborated by the
deterministic models of Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) and Colombo and Mosconi
(1995).
1 Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000, p. 13).
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However, the above literature neglects the effect of uncertainty. Smith (2005) considers
operating cost and investment cost uncertainty, using a real option model, and concludes that
the conventional wisdom described above does not necessarily hold if the costs are uncertain
and their growth rates differ significantly. However, she neglects the effect of competition.
We provide a somewhat richer model, which considers the effect of uncertainty, as well as
duopoly non-preemption competition, on the timing of the investment in two complementary
inputs. We rely on the Siddiqui and Takashima (2012) leader–follower duopoly model setting,
which comprises two alternative market structures: first, where spillover-knowledge (SK) is
allowed, and second, where there is proprietary-knowledge (PK).
In line with Smith (2005), we find that when the costs of two inputs are uncertain and
decreasing at different rates, it may pay, for both firms, to invest first in the input whose cost is
falling more slowly and wait to invest in the input whose cost is falling more rapidly. However,
this guideline applies more to the follower, and is dependent on the market structures and
assumptions on the ex-ante and ex-post market shares of the two firms. The leader is more
prone than the monopolistic firm of Smith (2005) to invest in the two inputs at the same time
(follows the behavior suggested by the conventional wisdom), whereas the follower is more
likely to invest in the two inputs sequentially (follows the behavior of the monopolist firm of
Smith 2005)—see Fig. 13 in “Appendix C”.
Our model setting is for a non-preemption game, therefore, the leader invests at the time
as a monopolist, and gets 100% of the market while operating alone, regardless of with
which input(s) she operates (input 1 alone, input 2 alone, or input 1 and input 2 at the same
time). Thus, the degree of competition (i.e., how the market share is divided between the
two firms when both are active) does not affect the timing of the leader’s investment in the
two inputs at the same time. However, we find that it influences significantly the timing
of the follower’s investment. The more asymmetric is the ex-post market share between
the two firms, favouring the leader, the later the follower invests, which makes more likely
asynchronous input-investments. This finding is somewhat surprising, because in a leader–
follower investment game as soon as the game ends for the leader, the follower is in a
monopoly-like position.
Furthermore, we show that: (i) in non-preemption duopoly SK and PK markets, an increase
in the input cost growth rate differences makes both firms more likely to invest in the two
inputs sequentially, (ii) for an inactive firm, a decrease in the cost growth rate of one input
and an increase in the cost growth rate of another input accelerates the investment in the input
whose cost growth rate is increasing, deters the investment in the input whose cost growth
rate is decreasing, but may have no effect on the timing of the investment in the two inputs
at the same time. We also find that sequential investments are more likely: (iii) when firms
are inactive and the cost growth rate of one input is increasing and the cost growth rate of
another input is decreasing, so there is a negative change in the cost growth rate of the two
inputs together.
Finally, we conclude that, for both the SK and the PK markets: (iv) for simultaneous-input
investments, the sensitivity of the follower’s investment threshold to changes in the degree
of complementarity is greater than that of the leader, and (v) an increase in the degree of
complementarity between input 1 and input 2, accelerates the investments of both firms in
the two inputs at the same time, if they are inactive, and the investment in input 2(1) if they
are active with 1(2).
The real options literature for monopoly markets neglects the effect of competition on
firms’ investment behavior, but it is very extensive and diverse in terms of practical applica-
tions (Martzoukos 2000; Smith 2005; Koussis et al. 2007; Bastian-Pinto et al. 2010; Franklin
2015; Chronopoulos and Siddiqui 2015; Farzan et al. 2015). Smets (1993) initiated a new
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branch of literature, now named “real option game” models, which study firms’ investment
behavior considering uncertainty and (duopoly) competition (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Ch.
9; Grenadier 1996; Huisman 2001; Weeds 2002; Huisman and Kort 2003, 2004; Paxson and
Pinto 2005; Pawlina and Kort 2006; Hsu and Lambrecht 2007; Moretto 2008; Thijssen 2010;
Femminis and Martini 2011; Leung and Kwok 2012; Pereira and Rodrigues 2014).2
Yet, the above literature neglects the existence of complementarity between investments.
Furthermore, with few exceptions (Huisman 2001, Ch. 9; Smith 2005; Decamps et al. 2006;
Nishihara 2012; Siddiqui and Takashima 2012), firms are usually assumed to hold (ex-ante)
only one option to invest.
However, firms often use inputs whose qualities are complements. Therefore, investment
decisions on upgrades or replacements must consider the degree of complementarity between
the inputs and the possibility of sequential-input investments. In this article “complemen-
tarity” exists if the investment in one input increases the marginal or incremental return to
another input in terms of “net cost savings”. More generally, in industrial organization con-
texts, complementarity exists if the implementation of one practice increases the marginal
return to another practice (see, e.g., Carree et al. 2011). When the implementation of a
technology/practice decreases the marginal return to the other technology/practice, there is
“substitutability” (or subadditivity).3
Notice that, due to technological progress, input costs are usually uncertain and might
follow different evolution patterns. For instance, according to a joint report by the U.S.
Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) and GTM Research, the cost of solar power
(technology) in the U.S. is now 60% cheaper than in early 2011, but the cost of the solar
panel sites may have increased.4 Therefore, it might be optimal to invest in the solar panel
sites first and defer the investment in the solar panels. Similar guidelines apply to wind
energy investments, if the cost growth rates of the wind towers and wind farm sites differ
significantly. Furthermore, wind towers comprise several components (e.g., the tower, rotor
hub, blades, etc.) whose cost growth rates may differ significantly. Therefore, it might be
optimal to replace the components of old wind farms sequentially, starting with those whose
cost is decreasing more slowly.5
There are also industries whose production is organized in sub-industries, with each sub-
industry corresponding to a production stage of the overall industry. This is the case of the
textile industry, which is organized in four main sub-industries: spinning, weaving, finishing
and making up, where there is high (production quality/efficiency) complementarity. The
adoption of a more advanced spinning technology increases not only the efficiency of the
spinning mill but also the efficiency of the weaving mills which use yarns produced by
the spinning mill whose technology was upgraded. But asynchronous investments might
be possible if there is a high cost growth rate asymmetry between the technologies used in
each of these sub-industries. Thus, we can see firms operating with highly advanced spinning
technologies and relatively obsolete weaving mills, or vice-versa (Griffiths et al. 1992; Conrad
and James 1995).
The concept of complementarity is also used to study economic decisions in other contexts.
For instance, when planning R&D activities, firms make strategic decisions regarding the
degree of complementarity (sometimes called compatibility) between the incumbent products
2 Recent literature reviews on real option game models are provided by Chevalier-Roignant et al. (2011) and
Azevedo and Paxson (2014).
3 See Carree et al. (2011).
4 See http://www.pv-magazine.com/, 20 September 2013.
5 See http://www.windmeasurementinternational.com/.
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and the new products they aim to launch in the future since the diffusion of an innovation
depends, to some extent, on the diffusion of complement innovations which amplify its
value.6
It has been also argued that the pace of modernization of industries is often influenced
by the degree of technological complementarity between the technologies adopted in the
industries. Milgrom and Roberts (1994) study the Japanese economy between 1940 and
1995 to interpret the characteristic features of Japanese economic organization in terms of
the complementarity between some of the most important elements of its economic struc-
ture. Colombo and Mosconi (1995) examine the diffusion of flexible automation production
and design/engineering technologies in the Italian metalworking industry, giving particular
attention to the role of the technological complementarity and the learning effects associated
with the experience of previously available technologies. From Milgrom and Roberts (1990,
1995) models, we infer that it is relatively unprofitable to adopt only one part of the modern
manufacturing technologies. Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 524) suggest that “we should
not see an extended period of time during which there are substantial volumes of both highly
flexible and highly specialized equipment being used side-by-side”.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we outline the model assumptions
and describe the two market structures. In Sect. 3, we derive the value functions and investment
thresholds for the two firms and each of the market structures, and provide some illustrative
sensitivity analysis. In Sect. 4, we show some further results. In Sect. 5, we conclude and
offer guidelines for future research.
2 The model
Suppose a market consists of two idle7 firms (i and j), where i, j = {L , F} with “L”
meaning “leader” and “F” meaning “follower”, considering the investment in two (available)
complementary inputs (input 1 and input 2), one after the other or both at the same time
depending on which of these choices maximizes value. The instantaneous “net cost savings”
(NCS) of firm i from the investment in input k is:
X (t)γk Dki k j (1)
where X (t) is the market revenue at time t ; γk ∈ (0, 1) is the “proportion of the revenue of
firm i that is expected to be saved if investing in input k”, with k = {0, 1, 2, 12}, where “0”
means that firm i is not yet active and “1”, “2” and “12” mean that firm i operates with input
1, input 2, or the two inputs at the same time, respectively; and Dki k j is the market share of
firm i for when the two firms operate with input(s) k.
6 In R&D contexts, firms who do not have a dominant market position and intend to grow rapidly tend
to manage their R&D efforts so as to launch new products which are compatible with those of their rivals
who have dominant market positions. Firms who have dominant market positions tend to guide their R&D
efforts in order to launch new products that are, as much as possible, not compatible with those of rivals. A
practical illustration of the later strategy is, for instance, the nine-year battle between the European Union
(EU) commission and Microsoft which culminated in October 2007 with a fine of e497 million due to a
supposed misconduct in developing software that does not allow open-source software developers access to
inter-operability information for work-group servers used by businesses and other large organizations (see
Etro (2007), p. 221, and Financial Times, October 23, 2007, p. 1).
7 In our model an idle firm can be inactive or active but operating without the most recent production input(s).
For instance, a firm operating with an old rail train with old tracks is idle in not yet adopting high-speed trains
and new tracks, if available.
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Market revenue, X (t), follows a geometric Brownian motion (gBm) process given by:8
d X = µX Xdt + σX XdzX (2)
where µX is the revenue growth rate, σX is the revenue volatility and dzX is the increment of
a standard Wiener process. For convergence reasons r − µX > 0 holds, where r is the risk
free interest rate.
Operating with input 1 provides a NCS (S1) which is a fraction (γ1) of the firm i’s revenue
(X.Dki k j ):
S1 = γ1 X.Dki k j (3)
Since NCS is proportional to revenue and this follows a gBm process, so NCS also follows
a gBm process. Similarly, the use of input 2 alone provides NCS equal to:
S2 = γ2 X.Dki k j (4)
The simultaneous use of the two inputs yields a NCS equal to:9
S12 = γ12 X.Dki k j (5)
The complementarity between the two inputs, ξ , with ξ = γ12− (γ1 +γ2) and ξ ∈ (0, 1),
is shown as:
γ12 > (γ1 + γ2) (6)
The investment (sunk) cost of the inputs 1 and 2, respectively I1 and I2, also follows gBm
processes:
d I1 = µI1 I1dt + σI1 I1dzI1 (7)
and
d I2 = µI2 I2dt + σI2 I2dzI2 (8)
where µI1 and µI2 are the growth rates of the cost of input 1 and input 2, respectively; σI1
and σI2 are the cost volatilities of inputs 1 and 2, respectively; and dzI1 and dzI2 are the
increments of the standard Wiener processes for the cost of input 1 and input 2, respectively.
If firms invest in the two inputs at the same time, the investment cost is I12 which we
assume also follows an independent gBm process, given by:10
d I12 = µI12 I12dt + σI12 I12dzI12 (9)
where µI12 is the instantaneous cost growth rate; σI12 is the cost volatility; and dzI12 is the
increment of the standard Wiener process.
Following Smets (1993), we impose the following constraints on the parameter Dki k j ,
where i represents the “leader” and j the “follower”:
(D12L 0F = D1L 0F = D2L 0F ) > (D12L 1F = D12L 2F ) > (D12L 12F = D1L 1F = D2L 2F )
(10)
8 For simplicity of the notation, henceforth we drop the “t”.
9 Suppose that a train operator gets: a 10% reduction in operating costs per passenger if investing in a new
train; 10% reduction in operating costs per passage if investing in a new track; and 30% reduction in operating
cost per passenger if investing in both a new train and a new track. There is complementarity between the two
investments and, within a given output range, savings increase with the sales.
10 We assume that the investment cost of the two inputs follows an independent stochastic process (i.e., it
is not necessarily equal to the sum of the cost of the two inputs). This is a realistic assumption for some
investments since suppliers may offer more favorable prices for higher investment commitments, and there
may be different cost savings if firms invest in the two inputs at the same time.
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with D12L 0F = D1L 0F = D2L 0F = 1.0, D12L 12F = D1L 1F = D2L 2F = 0.5 and D12L 1F =
D12L 2F ∈ (0.5, 1.0), which ensures that: (i) the leader gets 100% of the market share if active
alone; (ii) the two firms get the same market share (50%) if active with the same input(s);
(iii) the leader gets more than 50% of the market share if operating with the two inputs and
the follower operates with one input only.11 Additionally, the sum of the market shares of
the two firms equals 100% if at least one of the firms is active.
The “partial differential equation” (PDE) (11) describes the evolution of the value Fi, jk of
an inactive firm (i, j) that holds the option to invest in input(s) k:
1
2
σ 2X X
2 ∂
2 Fi, jk
∂X2
+ 1
2
σ 2Ik I
2
k
∂2 Fi, jk
∂ I 2k
+ X IkσXσIkρX Ik
∂2 Fi, jk
∂X∂ Ik
+ µX X ∂F
i, j
k
∂X
+µIk Ik
∂Fi, jk
∂ Ik
− r Fi, jk = 0 (11)
where ρX Ik is the correlation coefficient between the market revenue (X) and the cost of
input(s) k (Ik), with k ∈ {1, 2, 12}, r is the riskless interest rate, and ρX IK =0.
A useful analytical simplification of (11) is achieved by taking advantage of the natural
homogeneity of degree one of the investment problem—i.e., Fi, jk (X, Ik) = Ik f i, jk (X/Ik),
where f i, j12 is the variable to be determined.12 We reduce the dimensionality of the PDE (11)
from two to one using the following variable change: φk = X/Ik .13 Substituting φk in (11)
yields (12):14
1
2
σ 2mk (φk)
2 ∂
2 f i, jk (φk)
∂φ2k
+ (µX − µIk ) (φk)∂ f i, jk (φk)∂φk − (r − µIk ) f i, jk (φk) = 0 (12)
where σ 2mk = σ 2X + σ 2Ik − 2ρX IkσXσIk .
Equation (12) is a homogeneous second-order linear ordinary differential equation (ODE)
whose general solution has the form:
f i, jk (φk) = Ai, jk (φk)ψ1 + Bi, jk (φk)ψ2 (13)
where ψ1 (ψ2) is the positive (negative) solution of the characteristic quadratic function of
the ODE: 0.5(σmk )2ψ1(ψ1 − 1)+ (µX −µIk )ψ1 − (r −µIk ) = 0. Solving this equation for
ψ1 (ψ2) we get:
ψ1(2) = 12 −
µX − µIk
σ 2mk
+ (−)
√√√√( (µX − µIk )
σ 2mk
− 1
2
)2
+ 2(r − µIk )
σ 2mk
(14)
Notice that as the ratio of market revenue over cost of input k (φk) approaches 0, the
value of the option to invest in input k becomes worthless. Therefore, in (13) Bi, jk = 0.
Using the appropriate “value matching” (VM) and “smooth pasting” (SP) conditions for
each investment scenario, in the next section, we determine the constants (Ai, jk ) and the
investment thresholds for both firms.
11 The rationale for this assumption is that the leader gets higher cost savings due to the effect of comple-
mentarity between the two inputs and is able to use the cost savings advantage to earn a higher market share.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the two inputs are symmetric in terms of cost savings.
12 See proof in Sect. 1 of “Appendix A”.
13 This analytical simplification leads to the following input-related ratios: φ1 = X/I1, φ2 = X/I2 and
φ12 = X/I12.
14 See full derivation of (12) in Sect. 2 of “Appendix A”.
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2.1 Industry settings
We formulate a leader–follower investment problem for two specific industry scenarios,
following Siddiqui and Takashima (2012, p. 585): (i) symmetric non-preemptive duopoly with
“spillover-knowledge” (SK); and (ii) symmetric non-preemptive duopoly with “proprietary-
knowledge” (PK). The difference between these two scenarios is that, in the former, due to a
weak patent-protection, the follower is allowed to proceed with his first-stage investment (in
input 1) immediately after the leader’s entry (with input 1) and, in the latter, due to a strong
patent-protection, the leader invests in the two inputs sequentially (first in input 1 and then
in input 2) with the follower inactive.
2.1.1 Non-preemptive duopoly with SK
This industry setting considers a duopoly where the leader cannot be pre-empted by the
follower in the first move. After the leader’s first move, the follower is allowed to proceed,
since he obtains knowledge of the leader investment (input 1) via spillover-knowledge. The
diagram in Fig. 1 indicates both investment approaches for the two firms: sequential-input
investment (solid lines) and simultaneous-input investment (dotted lines). From state (1,1) the
competition for establishing a dominant position remains sequential until the investment cycle
is completed in state (2,2). Similarly, in the direct approach (simultaneous-input investment-
dotted line), the leader invests first, before the follower is allowed to proceed. We add to the
Siddiqui and Takashima (2012) investment problem the effects of both the investment cost
uncertainty and the complementarity between the inputs in the two stages.
We tried to use a max-option analysis (see Decamps et al. 2006; Nishihara 2012) for
the optimization of the first-stage of the investment game, where firms solve the following
optimal stopping problem: sup
τ
E[e−rτV (X (τ ), I1(τ ), I2(τ ), I12(τ ))]. Yet such framework
is more suitable for mono-factor real option game models. When applied to our multi-factor
real option game model, it increases significantly the complexity of the derivations, since
our assumption regarding the homogeneity of degree one for PDE (11) would not hold—we
would have to solve a three-dimensional stochastic problem which would require complex
numerical solutions.
*SK
1L
φ (Eq. 54) *SK1Fφ (Eq. 42)
(0,0) (1,0)    (1,1)             
(2,0) (2,2) (2,1)
*SK
1 2F
φ + (Eq. 35)*SK12Fφ (Eq. 20)
*SK
12L
φ (Eq. 29) *SK1 2Lφ + (Eq. 49)
Fig. 1 Duopoly state transition with SK. Note: Due to SK the follower invests in input 1 before the leader
investment in input 2. The dotted lines in the diagram represent the direct approach where the two firms invest,
one after the other, in the two inputs at the same time. The solid lines represent the sequential-input investment
approach for the two firms. φ∗1L and φ
∗
1F are the leader and the follower thresholds to invest in input 1 alone,
respectively; φ∗1+2L and φ
∗
1+2F are the leader and the follower thresholds to invest in input 2 if active with
input 1, respectively; φ∗12L and φ
∗
12F are the leader and the follower thresholds to invest in the two inputs at
the same time, respectively. The information in between brackets refers to the equation provided in Sect. 3 for
the investment thresholds
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2.1.2 Non-preemptive duopoly with PK
In this scenario the leader is allowed to invest in inputs 1 and 2, sequentially or simultaneously,
with the follower inactive, due to proprietary-knowledge.
3 Analytical results
3.1 Simultaneous-input investments
3.1.1 SK market
In this section we consider that both firms are inactive at stage (0,0) and invest, one after the
other, in the two inputs at the same time if optimal to do so. I12 is the investment cost if firms
invest in the two inputs at the same time.
Follower ODE (12), with i = F and k = 12, describes the follower value if inactive in a SK
market, whose general solution is given by:15
f F,SK12 = AF,SK12 φη112 + BF,SK12 φη212 (15)
where η1(η2) is the positive (negative) solution of the characteristic quadratic function of the
ODE: 12 (σm12)
2η(η− 1)+ (µX −µI12)η− (r −µI12) = 0. Solving this equation for η1(η2)
leads to:
η1(2) = 12 −
µX − µI12
σ 2m12
+ (−)
√√√√( (µX − µI12)
σ 2m12
− 1
2
)2
+ 2(r − µI12)
σ 2m12
(16)
where σ 2m12 = σ 2X + σ 2I12 − 2ρX I12σXσI12 .
Notice that as φ12 approaches 0, the value of the option to invest in input 1 and input 2 at
the same time becomes worthless. Therefore, in (15) B12 = 0.16
The VM condition:
FF,SK12 (X
∗, I ∗12) =
X∗γ12 D12F 12L
r − µX − I
∗
12F (17)
has the following economic interpretation: before investing in input 1 and input 2 at the same
time the follower holds the option to invest whose value is given by the left-hand side of Eq.
(17). This option will be exercised at the moment the option value equals the present value of
the cash flows obtained from operating with the two inputs forever less the investment cost
(right-hand side of Eq. 17).
Dividing (17) by I ∗12F , replacing f
F,SK
12 (φ
∗
12) by A
F,SK
12 φ
∗
12
η1 and rewriting gives,
AF,SK12 φ
∗SKη1
12F =
φ∗SK12F γ12 D12F 12L
r − µX − 1 (18)
The SP condition is:
η1 AF,SK12 φ
∗SK
12F
(η1−1) = γ12 D12F 12L
r − µX (19)
15 In (15) the superscripts “F” and “SK” stand for “follower” and “spillover-knowledge”, respectively.
16 To save space, in the next subsections we omit this step.
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Solving together Eqs. (18) and (19) and rearranging we get the follower threshold to invest
in the inputs 1 and 2 at the same time, φ∗SK12F , and the constant A
F,SK
12 , respectively:
φ∗SK12F =
η1
η1 − 1
r − µX
γ12 D12F 12L
(20)
AF,SK12 =
φ∗SK12 (1−η1)
η1
γ12 D12F 12L
r − µX (21)
The follower value function is given by:
f F,SK12 (φ12) =
⎧⎨⎩ A
F,SK
12 φ
η1
12 if φ12 < φ
∗SK
12F
φ12γ12 D12F 12L
r−µX − 1 if φ12 ≥ φ∗SK12F
(22)
The first row of (22) represents the follower option to invest in the two inputs at the same
time; the second row is the perpetual payoff the follower attains from operating in the market
with the leader (both with the two inputs) from the instant φ∗12F is reached.
Leader Assuming that the follower invests in the two inputs at the same time when φ∗SK12F is
reached, the leader’s payoff is given by:
F L ,SK12 (X, I12) = E |X(0)=X
[
∫T12Ft=τ Xτ γ12 D12L 0F e−rτdτ − I ∗12L
+ ∫∞T12F Xτ γ12 D12L 12F e
−rτdτ
]
(23)
where the first integral represents the payoff attained from the instant of the investments in
inputs 1 and 2 at the same time made before the follower invests in inputs 1 and 2 at the
same time; I ∗12L is the cost of the two inputs at the time of the investment; and the second
integral represents the leader payoff from operating with the follower (both firms with the
two inputs) from the moment the follower invests in inputs 1 and 2 at the same time.
The leader value function is given by:
f L ,SK12 (∅12)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
AL,SK12 ∅η112 +
∅∗SK12F γ12
(
D12L 12F−D12L 0F
)
r−µX
(
∅12
∅∗SK12F
)η1
i f ∅12 < ∅∗SK12L
∅12γ12 D12L 0F
r−µX − 1 +
∅∗SK12F γ12
(
D12L 12F−D12L 0F
)
r−µX
(
∅12
∅∗SK12F
)η1
i f ∅12ϵ
[
∅∗SK12L ,∅∗SK12F
)
∅12γ12 D12L 12F
r−µX − 1 i f ∅12 ≥ ∅∗SK12F
(24)
In the first row, the first term is the leader option value to invest in the two inputs at the
same time, which is the same as that of a monopolist, and the second term is a correction
factor which incorporates the fact that in the future if φ∗SK12F is reached the follower will invest
in inputs 1 and 2 and the leader payoff will be reduced (in markets where there is fear of
pre-emption, this term does not exists because, at this stage, both firms have equal chances
of being the leader).17 It is negative given that (D12L 12F − D12L 0F ) < 0—see inequality
10.18 In the second row, the first two terms represent the leader payoff from operating with
17 To save space, in the next subsections we do not show the expressions for the value functions.
18 Notice that this term equals the leader’s loss discounted back from the (random) time at which the follower
invests in inputs 1 and 2. The term (φ12/φ∗SK12F )
η1 is interpreted as a stochastic discount factor which is equal
to the present value of $1 received when the variable φ12 hits φ∗SK12F (see Pawlina and Kort 2006, p. 8).
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the two inputs from φ∗SK12L onwards (with the follower inactive) less the investment cost, the
third term is the correction factor described above. The third row is the leader’s perpetual
payoff, while operating with the follower (both firms with the two inputs), from the instant
the follower invests in the two inputs, less the investment cost.19
This is a non-preemption game and, therefore, the leader enters the market at the moment
her payoff is maximized. ODE (12), with k = 12, describes the leader’s value if inactive,
whose solution is given by:
f L,SK12 = AL,SK12 φη112 (25)
The constant AL,SK12 and the leader threshold, φ∗SK12L , are determined using the following
VM and SP conditions. The VM condition is given by:20
AL,SK12 φ
∗SK
12L
η1 = φ
∗SK
12L γ12 D12L 0F
r − µX − 1 (26)
SP condition:
η1 AL,SK12 φ
∗SK
12L
(η1−1) = γ12 D12L 0F
r − µX (27)
Solving together (26) and (27) we obtain AL ,SK12 and φ∗SK12L , given by:
AL,SK12 =
γ12 D12L 0F
(r − µX )η1φ∗SK12L
(η1−1) (28)
φ∗SK12L =
η1(r − µX )
η1γ12 D12L 0F − γ12 D12L 0F
(29)
Notice that although the leader’s investment threshold for a duopoly non-preemption
market is the same as that of a monopolistic firm, its value is lower because the follower may
enter the market later, eroding its market share.21
3.1.2 PK market
“Simultaneous-input” investments are “one-shot” games for the two firms in both the PK
and the SK markets. Therefore, the investment behavior of the leader and the follower is the
same for the two markets and the following proposition holds:22
19 To save space, in the next subsections we do not show the expressions for the value functions.
20 Notice that the second term of the first row cancels the third term of the second row.
21 For a monopoly market, the derivation steps in order to get the investment thresholds to adopt input 1 and
input 2 at the same time are the same as those we provide in this section. The only difference is that, in the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, the competition factor (i.e., the market share) is absent—the
threshold is given by ∅∗,SK12 = η1η1−1
r−µX
γ12
.
22 Notice that, in sequential-input investments, the difference between the SK and PK markets is that, in the
latter, the leader completes the two investment stages before the follower is allowed to proceed, whereas in the
former, the follower is allowed to invest in the first stage (input 1) immediately after the first-stage investment
of the leader.
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Table 1 Market variables
X I1 I2 I12 µX µI1 µI2 µI12 r σX σI1 σI2 σI12 ρX I1 ρX I2 ρX I12
10 5 5 10 0.02 −0.05 −0.10 −0.075 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
Table 2 Firms’ market revenue share, Dki k j
Leader Follower
D1L 0F D12L 0F D12L 1F D12L 12F D1L 1F D2L 2F D12F 12L D1F 1L D2F 2L D1F 12L
1.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Table 3 Complementarity
related factors, ξ and γk
γ2 γ2 γ12 ξ = γ12 − (γ1 + γ2)
0.10 0.10 0.30 0.10
Proposition 1
f L,PK12 (φ12) = f L,SK12 (φ12)— given by expression 24 (29a)
f F,PK12 (φ12) = f F,SK12 (φ12)—given by expression 22 (29b)
φ∗PK12L = φ∗SK12L — given by Eq. 29 (29c)
φ∗PK12F = φ∗SK12F — given by Eq. 20 (29d)
where f L,PK12 (φ12) and φ∗PK12L are the leader’s value function and investment threshold for
the PK market, respectively; f F,PK12 (φ12) and φ∗PK12F are the follower’s value function and
investment threshold for the PK market, respectively. Proof: see “Appendix B”.
3.1.3 Illustrative results (base parameter values are in Tables 1, 2 and 3)
The results above show that for both markets, ceteris paribus: (i) an increase in ρX/I12 , or
ξ , or µI12 accelerates the investment in the two inputs at the same time for both firms, with
the follower slightly more sensitive than the leader to these changes; and (ii) an increase in
D12L 12F delays the investment of the follower and has no effect on the investment threshold
of the leader. This latter result means that the more asymmetric the competition between
the two firms (in terms of ex-post market share) the later the investment in the two inputs
simultaneously for the follower.
However, input cost uncertainty can make such behavior unlikely for the follower (in
Sect. 4.1 we discuss this finding further). We also find that an increase in the revenue volatility
or the investment cost volatility delays the investment for both firms. 23
23 To save space we do not show these illustrative results.
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3.2 “Sequential-input” investments
3.2.1 SK market
SK market, terminal-state: follower We start by deriving the follower’s value function and
investment threshold for the state where he is active with input 1 and the leader is active with
both inputs. Therefore, the follower is in a monopoly-like position and his behavior replicates
that of a monopolist.24 His value comprises the option value to invest in input 2, f F,SK1+2 (φ2),
plus the cost savings attained from operating with input 1 forever, Xγ1 D1F 12L /(r−µX ). Fol-
lowing similar procedures as those described in the previous section, we get the homogeneous
second-order linear ODE (12), with k = 2, whose general solution has the form:
f F,SK1+2 (φ2) = AF,SK1+2 φψ12 (30)
whereψ1 is the positive solution of the characteristic quadratic function of the homogeneous
part of Eq. (12): 0.5(σm2)2ψ(ψ − 1)+ (µX −µI2)ψ − (r −µI2) = 0. Solving this equation
for ψ1 we get:
ψ1 = 12 −
µX − µI2
σ 2m2
+
√√√√( (µX − µI2)
σ 2m2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2(r − µI2)
σ 2m2
(31)
where σ 2m2 = σ 2X + σ 2I2 − 2ρX I2σXσI2 .
The VM condition is:
FF,SK1+2 (X
∗, I ∗2 )+
X∗γ1 D1F 12L
r − µX =
X∗γ12 D12F 12L
r − µX − I
∗
2F (32)
Before investing in input 2 the follower’s payoff is equal to the value of the option to
invest in input 2 plus the present value from operating with input 1 forever, with the leader
active with the two inputs (left-hand side of 32). The option to invest in input 2 is exercised
at the moment its value equals the present value of the cash flows the follower obtains from
operating with the two inputs forever less the cost of input 2 (right-hand side of 32).
Dividing (32) by I ∗2F , replacing f
F,SK
1+2 (φ∗2 ) by A
F,SK
1+2 φ∗SK1+2
ψ1 and rewriting gives:25
AF,SK1+2 φ
∗SK
1+2F
ψ1 = φ
∗SK
1+2F γ12 D12F 12L − φ1γ1 D1F 12L
r − µX − 1 (33)
The SP condition is given by:
ψ1 AF,SK1+2 φ
∗SK
1+2F
(ψ1−1) = γ12 D12F 12L
r − µX (34)
24 For a monopoly market, the derivation steps in order to get the investment thresholds to adopt input 2 alone
if active with input 1, and input 1 alone if active with inputs 2, are the same as those we provide in this section.
The only difference is that in the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions the competition factor (i.e.,
the market share) is absent—the thresholds are given by: ∅∗SK1+2 = ψ1ψ1−1
r−µX
γ12−γ1 and ∅
∗,SK
2+1 = ψ1ψ1−1
r−µX
γ12−γ2 ,
respectively.
25 Notice that φ∗1+2 is the threshold which if reached justifies the follower investing in input 2 if active with
input 1. Therefore, in the VM condition we replace the φ2 of Eq. (30) by φ∗1+2F .
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Solving together Eqs. (33) and (34) we get the follower threshold for investing in input 2
if active with input 1, φ∗SK1+2F , and the constant A
F,SK
1+2 , respectively:
φ∗SK1+2F =
ψ1(µX − r)− ψ1φ1γ1 D1F 12L
γ12 D12F 12L (1− ψ1)
(35)
AF,SK1+2 =
γ12 D12F 12L
(r − µX )ψ1φ∗SK1+2F
(ψ1−1) (36)
SK market, first-state: follower Now we derive the follower’s value function and investment
threshold for the state where he is inactive and the leader is active with input 1. Following
similar procedures as those of the previous subsections we get the homogeneous second-order
linear ODE (12), with k = 1, whose general solution in this case has the form:
f F,SK1 (φ1) = AF,SK1 φβ11 (37)
where β1 is the positive solution of the characteristic quadratic function of the homogeneous
part of Eq. (12): 0.5(σm1)2β(β − 1)+ (µX −µI1)β − (r −µI1) = 0. Solving this equation
for β1 we get:
β1 = 12 −
µX − µI1
σ 2m1
+
√√√√( (µX − µI1)
σ 2m1
− 1
2
)2
+ 2(r − µI1)
σ 2m1
(38)
where σ 2m1 = σ 2X + σ 2I1 − 2ρX I1σXσI1 .
The VM condition is:
FF,SK1 (X, I1) =
X∗γ1 D1F 1L
r − µX − I
∗
1F (39)
Before investing in input 1 the follower’s payoff is equal to the value of the option to invest
in input 1 (left-hand side of Eq. 39). This option will be exercised at the moment its value
equals the follower’s present value of the cash flows from operating with input 1 forever less
the investment cost (right-hand side of Eq. 39).
Dividing (39) by I ∗1F , replacing f
F,SK
1 (φ1) by A
F,SK
1 φ
∗SK
1
β1 and rewriting gives:
AF,SK1 φ
∗SK
1F
β1 = φ
∗SK
1F γ1 D1F 1L
r − µX − 1 (40)
The SP condition is:
β1 AF,SK1 φ
∗SK
1F
(β1−1) = γ1 D1F 1L
r − µX (41)
Solving together Eqs. (40) and (41) we get the follower’s threshold for investing in input
1 if inactive, φ∗SK1F , and the constant A
F,SK
1 :
φ∗SK1F =
β1
β1 − 1
r − µX
γ1 D1F 1L
(42)
AF,SK1 =
φ∗SK1F
(1−β1)
β1
γ1 D1F 1L
r − µX (43)
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SK market-terminal state: leader At the instant the leader invests in input 2, τ , her payoff is
given by:
FL,SK1+2 (X, I2) = E
[∫ T2F
τ
Xtγ12 D12L 1F e
−rτdτ − I ∗2L +
∫ ∞
T2F
Xtγ12 D12L 12F e
−rτdτ
]
(44)
where the first integral represents the leader’s payoff from the moment of the investment
in input 2 until the instant before the follower invests in input 2; and the second integral
represents the leader’s payoff from the moment the follower invests in input 2 onwards.
This is a non-preemption game, hence the leader, if active with input 1, invests in input
2 at the point her payoff is maximized. ODE (12), with k = 2, describes the leader’s value
whose solution is given, in this case, by:
f L ,SK1+2 (φ2) = AL ,SK1+2 φψ12 (45)
The constant AL ,SK1+2 and the leader’s threshold are determined using the following VM
and SP conditions:
VM condition:
φ1γ1 D1L 1F
r − µX + A
L ,SK
1+2 φ
∗SKψ1
1+2L =
φ∗SK1+2L γ12 D12L 1F
r − µX − 1 (46)
with the following economic interpretation: the leader, if active with input 1, invests in input
2 at the moment the value attained from operating with input 1 forever plus the value of the
option to invest in input 2 equals the present value of the perpetual cash flow obtained from
operating with the two inputs forever less the investment cost (cost of input 2) (Fig. 2).
SP condition:
ψ1 AL ,SK1+2 φ
∗SK (ψ1−1)
1+2L =
γ12 D12L 1F
r − µX (47)
*PK
1L
φ (Eq. 60)
(0,0) (1,0)    
(2,0) (2,2) (2,1)
*PK
12F
φ (Eq. 20) *PK1 2Fφ + (Eq. 35)
*PK
1F
φ (Eq. 60)
*PK
1 2L
φ + (Eq. 67)*PK12Lφ (Eq. 29)
Fig. 2 Duopoly state transition with PK. Note: The dotted lines refer to the direct approach where the two
firms invest, one after the other, in the two inputs at the same time; the solid lines refer to the scenario where
the two firms invest, one after the other, in the two inputs sequentially. The information in between brackets
refers to the equation provided in Sect. 3 for the investment thresholds
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Solving together (46) and (47) we obtain the constant AL,SK1+2 :
AL ,SK1+2 =
γ12 D12L 1F
(r − µX )ψ1φ∗SK (ψ1−1)1+2L
(48)
and the leader’s threshold:
φ∗SK1+2L =
φ1ψ1γ1 D1L 1F + ψ1(r − µX )
γ12 D12L 1F (ψ1 − 1)
(49)
SK market, first-state: leader The leader enters the market with input 1 at the point her payoff
is maximized. ODE (12), with k = 1, describes the leader’s value if inactive, whose solution
is given by:
f L,SK1 (φ1) = AL,SK1 φβ11 (50)
The constant AL,SK1 and the leader’s threshold are determined using the following VM
and SP conditions:
VM condition:
AL,SK1 φ
∗SK
1L
β1 = φ
∗SK
1L γ1 D1L 0F
r − µX − 1 (51)
The leader should invest in input 1 at the moment the option value to invest in input 1
equals the value she obtains from operating with input 1 alone forever less the investment
cost (cost of input 1).
SP condition:
β1 AL ,SK1 ∅∗SK (β1−1)1L =
γ1 D1L 0F
r − µX (52)
Solving together (51) and (52) we obtain the constant AL1+2, given by:
AL,SK1 =
γ1 D1L 0Fφ∗SK1L
(1−β1)
β1(r − µX ) (53)
and the leader’s threshold, given by:26
φ∗SK1L =
β1(r − µX )
β1γ1 D1L 0F − γ1 D1L 0F
(54)
Proposition 2 two inactive firms in a non-preemption duopoly (SK or PK) market invest in
two complementary inputs (input 1 and input 2) sequentially if and only if there is a time t,
t ∈ [0,∞), where φ1(t) reaches φ∗1L (t) and φ∗1F (t) the first time with φ12(t) < φ∗12L (t) and
φ12(t) < φ∗12F (t). Proof: see “Appendix B”.
26 Notice that if firms start with input 2, their threshold expression would be the same, only the notation
“1” and “2” changes. To save space we show the derivations for the case where firms start with input 1 only,
although illustrative results and sensitivity analyses are provided in Sect. 4 for both cases.
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3.2.2 Illustrative results
The above results show that an increase in σX delays the investment for both firms and
an increase in ρX/I1 accelerates the investment in input 1 for both firms, with the follower
slightly more sensitive than the leader to changes in these variables (Fig. 3).
The above results show that an increase in µI1 accelerates the investment for both firms
and an increase in D1L 1F delays the investment of the follower and has no effect on the
investment threshold of the leader (Fig. 4).
The above results are like those of Fig. 5 and, therefore, similar comments apply.
The above results show that an increase in ξ accelerates the investment in the second input
for both firms and an increase in D1L 1F delays the investment of the leader in the second
input (input 2) and has no effect on the investment threshold of the follower (Fig. 6).
The above results show that an increase in D12L 1F accelerates the investment in the second
input (input 2) for both firms and an increase in D12L 12F delays significantly the investment
of the follower in the second input (input 2) and has no effect on the investment threshold of
the leader (Fig. 7).
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
-1.00 -0.50  -  0.50  1.00
ρX/I12
Ф*12F,SK&PK
Ф*12L,SK&PK
 -
 0.50
 1.00
 1.50
 2.00
 -  0.10  0.20  0.30  0.40
ξ
Ф*12F,SK&PK
Ф*12L,SK&PK
Fig. 3 This figure shows the effect on the investment thresholds of the leader (Eq. 29) and the follower (Eq. 20)
of changes in the correlation between market revenue and the cost of the two inputs, ρX/I12 , (left-hand side)
and the degree of complementarity between the two inputs, ξ = γ12 − (γ1 + γ2), (right-hand side) for the
SK and PK markets. Given that, according to Proposition 1, the investment threshold expressions for the SK
and PK markets are the same, we use , ∗ 12L, SK&PK and , ∗ 12F, SK&PK to represent the investment
thresholds for both markets, for the leader and the follower, respectively
 -
 0.50
 1.00
 1.50
 2.00
-0.20 -0.10  -  0.10  0.20
μI12
Ф*12F,SK&PK
Ф*12L,SK&PK
 -
 0.50
 1.00
 1.50
 2.00
 0.50  0.55  0.60  0.65
D12L,12F
Ф*12F,SK&PK
Ф*12L,SK&PK
Fig. 4 This figure shows, for the SK and PK markets, the effect on firms’ investment thresholds of changes
in the cost growth rate of the two inputs, µI12 , (left-hand side) and the leader’s market share when both firms
are active with the two inputs, D12L 12F , (right-hand side)
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Fig. 5 This figure shows the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 54) and the follower (Eq. 42)
to invest in input 1 if in a SK market, to changes in the market revenue volatility (left-hand side) and the
correlation between the market revenue and the cost of input 1 (right-hand side)
Fig. 6 This figure shows the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 54) and the follower (Eq. 42) to
invest in input 1 if in a SK market, to changes in the cost growth rate of input 1 (left-hand side) and the leader’s
market share if both firms are active with the input 1 (right-hand side)
Fig. 7 This figure shows the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 49) and the follower (Eq. 35) to
invest in input 2 if active with input 1 in the SK market, to changes in the market revenue volatility (left-hand
side) and the correlation between the market revenue and the cost of input 2 (right-hand side)
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3.2.3 PK market
PK market, terminal-state: follower For the terminal state of sequential-input investments
with the leader active with the two inputs, the threshold expression of the follower is the
same for both the PK and the SK markets. Therefore, the following condition holds:
Proposition 3
φ∗PK1+2F = φ∗SK1+2F - given by Eq. 35 (55)
where φ∗PK1+2F and φ
∗SK
1+2F are the follower’s thresholds to invest in input 2 if active with input
1 in the PK and the SK markets, respectively. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
PK market, first-state: follower In the first-state the follower optimizes the timing of the
investment in input 1, with the leader active with the two inputs.27 Following similar proce-
dures as those of the previous sections we get the homogeneous second-order linear ODE
(12), with k = 1, whose general solution has the form:
f F,PK1 (φ1) = AF,PK1 φλ11 (56)
where λ1 is the positive solution of the characteristic quadratic function of the homogeneous
part of Eq. (12): 0.5(σm1)2λ(λ− 1)+ (µX − µI1)λ− (r − µI1) = 0. Solving this equation
for λ1 we get:
λ1 = 12 −
µX − µI1
σ 2m1
+
√√√√( (µX − µI1)
σ 2m1
− 1
2
)2
+ 2(r − µI1)
σ 2m1
(57)
where σ 2m1 = σ 2X + σ 2I1 − 2ρX I1σXσI1 .
The following VM condition is:
AF,PK1 φ
∗PK
1F
λ1 = φ
∗PK
1F γ1 D1F 12L
r − µX − 1 (58)
Before investing in input 1, the follower’s payoff is equal to the value of the option to
invest in input 1 (left-hand side of Eq. 58). This option is exercised at the moment its value
equals the present value of the follower’s cash flows from operating with input 1 forever
(with the leader active with the two inputs) less the investment cost (right-hand side of Eq.
58).
The SP condition is:
λ1 AF,PK1 φ
∗PK
1F
(λ1−1) = γ1 D1F 12L
r − µX (59)
Solving together Eqs. (58) and (59) we get the follower’s threshold for investing in input
1 if inactive, φ∗PK1F , and the constant A
F,PK
1 :
φ∗PK1F =
λ1
λ1 − 1
r − µX
γ1 D1F 12L
(60)
AF,PK1 =
φ∗PK1F
(1−λ1)
λ1
γ1 D1F 12L
r − µX (61)
27 Notice that one of the differences between the PK and the SK markets is that in the latter the follower
optimizes the investment in input 1 with the leader active with input 1 only.
123
Ann Oper Res
PK market, terminal-state: leader This is a non-preemption game and therefore the leader,
if active with input 1, invests in input 2 at the moment her payoff is maximized. ODE (12),
with k = 2, describes the leader’s option value to invest in input 2 if active with input 1,
whose solution is given by:
f L,PK1+2 (φ2) = AL,PK1+2 φυ12 (62)
where υ1 is the positive solution of the characteristic quadratic function of the homogeneous
part of Eq. (12) given by: 12 (σm2)2υ(υ − 1) + (µX − µI2)υ − (r − µI2) = 0. Solving the
equation above for υ1 leads to:
υ1 = 12 −
µX − µI2
σ 2m2
+
√√√√( (µX − µI2)
σ 2m2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2(r − µI2)
σ 2m2
(63)
The constant AL,PK1+2 and the leader’s threshold are determined using the following VM
and SP conditions:
VM condition:
φ1γ1 D1L 0F
r − µX + A
L,PK
1+2 φ
∗SKυ1
1+2L =
φ∗PK1+2L γ12 D12L 0F
r − µX − 1 (64)
The leader should invest in input 2 at the moment the value she attains from operating
with input 1 alone forever plus the value of the option to invest in input 2 (left-hand side of
Eq. 64) equals the present value of the cash flows she obtains from operating with the two
inputs forever less the investment cost (right-hand side of Eq. 64).
SP condition:
υ1 AL ,SK1+2 φ
∗SK(υ1−1)
1+2L =
γ12 D12L 0F
r − µX (65)
Solving together (62), (64) and (65) we obtain the constant AL,SK1+2 :
AL,PK1+2 =
γ12 D12L 0F
(r − µX )υ1φ∗PK(υ1−1)1+2L
(66)
and the leader’s threshold:
φ∗PK1+2L =
φ1υ1γ1 D1L 0F + υ1(r − µX )
γ12 D12L 0F (υ1 − 1)
(67)
PK market-first state: leader In the first-state of “sequential-input investments” the invest-
ment threshold expression of the leader for the PK and SK markets are the same. Therefore,
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4
φ∗PK1L = φ∗SK1L - given by Eq. 54 (68)
where φ∗PK1L and φ
∗SK
1L are the leader’s investment threshold to invest in input 1 if inactive in
the PK and SK markets, respectively. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
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Fig. 8 This figure shows the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 49) and the follower (Eq. 35) to
invest in input 2 if active with input 1, to changes in ξ (left-hand side) and the leader’s market share if both
firms are active with input 1, D1L 1F (right-hand side)
3.2.4 Illustrative results
The results show that the investment threshold of the leader is lower than that of the follower
(as expected) and that both increase with the revenue volatility. Comparing the thresholds
of the left-hand side with those of the right-hand side, we conclude that for both firms, the
threshold to invest in input 1 if active with input 2 is lower than the threshold to invest in input
2 if active with input 1. This is because in our base parameters we use µI1 = − 0.05 and
µI2 = − 0.10 (i.e. the cost of input 2 decreases more rapidly than the cost of input 1). This
result supports the conclusion that when the cost of two complementary inputs decreases
at different rates it might be optimal to invest sequentially, first, in the input with the cost
decreasing less rapidly, a result which is in line with that of Smith (2005).
The above results show that an increase in D12L 1F delays the investment of the follower in
input 1 if inactive and has no effect on the investment threshold of the leader. The sensitivity
of the investment thresholds of both firms to changes in ξ are similar to those described in
the previous subsections for the SK market (Fig. 8) and therefore similar comments apply.
4 Results
In this section we provide further sensitivity analysis regarding the most relevant model
parameters. As for the previous results, we use the following base parameters where for
simplicity of notation δ = µI1 − µI2 .
In our model, ex-ante, firms hold three options to invest (in input 1 alone, input 2 alone
and inputs 1 and 2 at the same time) whose values are driven by independent (stochastic)
underlying variables. Therefore, in order to characterize the market conditions that (at a given
time t) imply sequentially-input and/or simultaneously-input investments for each firm and
market structures, we should analyse if the investment thresholds related to each of the above
options are crossed. If firms are inactive and the threshold to invest in input 1 (or input 2)
alone is crossed before the threshold to invest in the two inputs at the same time, they invest
sequentially, starting with input 1 (or input 2). If firms are inactive and the threshold to invest
in input 1 and input 2 at the same time is crossed before the threshold to invest in the input 1
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Table 4 This table provides complementary results for the combined effect of changes in ξ = γ12−(γ1+γ2)
and δ = (µ1 −µ2) on the threshold to invest in the two inputs at the same time, for the leader (top panel) and
the follower (bottom panel)
1γ 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
2γ 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
12γ 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
1I
µ
2I
µ
ξ
δ 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
L
*PK&SK
12φ
(leader)
– 0.05 – 0.05 0.00 0.75 0.60 0.50 0.43 0.38 0.33
– 0.05 – 0.10 0.05 0.87 0.69 0.58 0.50 0.43 0.39
– 0.05 – 0.15 0.10 0.99 0.79 0.66 0.56 0.49 0.44
– 0.05 – 0.20 0.15 1.11 0.89 0.74 0.63 0.55 0.49
– 0.05 – 0.25 0.20 1.23 0.98 0.82 0.70 0.61 0.55
– 0.05 – 0.30 0.25 1.35 1.08 0.90 0.77 0.68 0.60
F
*PK&SK
12φ
(follower)
– 0.05 – 0.05 0.00 1.50 1.20 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.83
– 0.05 – 0.10 0.05 1.73 1.39 1.16 0.99 0.87 0.77
– 0.05 – 0.15 0.10 1.97 1.58 1.31 1.13 0.99 0.88
– 0.05 – 0.20 0.15 2.21 1.77 1.48 1.26 1.11 0.98
– 0.05 – 0.25 0.20 2.45 1.96 1.64 1.40 1.23 1.09
– 0.05 – 0.30 0.25 2.70 2.16 1.80 1.54 1.35 1.20
φ12(t) = 1
If φ12(t) ≥ φ∗PK&SK12L the leader invests, otherwise wait
If φ12(t) ≥ φ∗PK&SK12F the follower invests, otherwise wait
The threshold values in italics mean that firms should invest
(or input 2) alone, they invest in the two inputs at the same time.28 Therefore, comparing the
threshold values stated in Tables 4 and 5 below with the value of the (respective) underlying
variable (φ12(t) = 1, φ1(t) = 2 or φ2(t) = 2) we can identify the market conditions (in
terms of ξ and δ) that determine whether the investments in the two inputs are sequential or
simultaneous.
Table 4 shows a sensitivity analysis for the thresholds to invest in the two inputs at the
same time to changes in ξ and δ, using the base parameter values.
The above results show that while the leader’s thresholds were crossed for most sce-
narios, the follower’s thresholds were crossed for few scenarios only, which suggests that
simultaneous-input investments are less likely for the follower. We can also see that ξ and δ
have opposite effects on the investment thresholds of both firms. An increase in ξ accelerates
the investment and an increase in δ delays the investment.
These contrasting effects make the conventional wisdom, which says that “when a pro-
duction process requires two extremely complementary inputs, a firm should upgrade (or
replace) them simultaneously…”, less likely to hold for the follower when input drift dif-
ferences are large, a result which was highlighted by Smith (2005) for a monopoly market.
Notice that the marginal changes used for ξ and δ are of the same size (0ξ = 0δ = 0.05)
and yet the threshold values of the diagonals of both matrices decrease slightly as ξ and δ
28 Notice that if firms are inactive and the thresholds to invest simultaneously in input 1 and input 2 and to
invest in input 1 (or input 2) alone are crossed at the same time, firms will invest in the two inputs at the same
time.
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Fig. 9 This figure shows the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 49) and the follower (Eq. 35) to
invest in input 2 if active with input 1, to changes in the leader’s market share when she is active with the two
inputs and the follower is active with input 1, D12L 1F (left-hand side) and when both firms are active with
the two inputs, D12L 12F (right-hand side)
Fig. 10 This figure shows the sensitivity of the investment thresholds of the leader (Eq. 67) and the follower
(Eq. 35) to invest in input 2 if active with input 1 (left-hand side) or invest in input 1 if active with input 2
(right-hand side) to changes in the market revenue volatility
increase (see threshold values underlined), which means that the effect of changes in the
former parameter values slightly dominates that of the latter.
Table 5 shows a sensitivity analysis for all the investment thresholds, using µI1 = 0, and
changing µI2 , from − 0.05 to 0.30, ceteris paribus, in order to illustrate more clearly our
findings (Fig. 9).
The above results show that both φ∗PK&SK12L and φ
∗PK&SK
1L are crossed for the whole range
of δ values, whereas φ∗PK&SK2L is crossed when δ = {0.05, 0.10}. Therefore, the leader invests
in the two inputs at the same time in all scenarios. For the follower, φ∗PK&SK12F is crossed in
two scenarios only, and φ∗SK1F is not crossed for all scenarios. Specifically, as the cost growth
rates difference increases, φ∗SK1F does not change but φ
∗PK&SK
12F increases significantly, making
the investment in the two inputs at the same time less likely. This latter result contradicts
the conventional wisdom for complementary investments, and corroborates Smith (2005)
findings for a monopolist firm (Fig. 10).
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Fig. 11 The two figures at the top show the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 67) and the follower
(Eq. 35) to invest in input 2 if active with input 1, to changes in ρX/I12 (left-hand side) and ξ (right-hand
side). The figure at the bottom shows the sensitivity of the thresholds of the leader (Eq. 60) and the follower
(Eq. 54) to invest in input 1 if inactive, to changes in the leader’s market share when she is active with the two
inputs and the follower is active with input 1 (D12L 1F )
4.1 Further analysis
In most real option models such as those of Decamps et al. (2006), Nishihara (2012) and
Siddiqui and Takashima (2012), the value of the ex-ante real options are driven by the same
stochastic variable. However, in our model, the value of the ex-ante real options (to invest
in input 1 alone, or input 2 alone or input 1 and input 2 at the same time) are driven by
three independent stochastic variables (φ1(t), ∅2(t) and φ12(t), respectively). While this
modelling setting is more realistic, it complicates significantly the characterization of the
market conditions that justify sequential-input or simultaneous-input investments for the two
firms because the investment thresholds (related to φ1(t), ∅2(t) and φ12(t)) are not directly
comparable. In this section we summarize some further relevant insights on the effect of µI1 ,
µI2 and δ on firms’ investment behavior (Fig. 11).
4.1.1 Input cost growth rates
As shown in Sect. 3, the cost growth rate of the two inputs play a very important role in firms’
investment behavior. Below we explore with further detail some of the results of Sect. 3 (Fig.
12).
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Sequential-input investments are 
more likely for both firms,
starting with input 1.
Both Sequential-input and
Simultaneous-input investments 
are possible depending on the 
relative values of 
1I
µ and 
2I
µ . 
Sequential-input investments are 
more likely for both firms,
starting with input 2.
Both Sequential-input and          45
Simultaneous-input investments 
are possible depending on the relative 
values of 
1Iµ and 2Iµ .
1
( )         Iµ
∞
0δ = conventional wisdom is more 
likely to hold (i.e., the two inputs are 
more likely to be adopted at the same 
time).
−∞
−∞
2
  ( )Iµ∞
Fig. 12 This figure illustrates the most likely investment behavior (sequential-input vs simultaneous-input)
for the leader and the follower according to the relative values of µI1 and µI2 , for both the SK and PK markets
We start our analysis by the scenarios where the set of (µI1 ,µI2 ) points are in the south-
east or north-west quadrants, and conclude, respectively: if µI1 ↓, with µI1 ∈ (−∞, 0],
and µI2 ↑, with µI2 ∈ [0,+∞), φ∗1L ↑, φ∗1F ↑, φ∗2L ↓ and φ∗2F ↓, and sequential-input
investments (starting with input 2) are more likely for both firms. If µI1 ↑, with µI1 ∈[0,+∞), and µI2 ↓, with µI2 ∈ (−∞, 0], φ∗1L ↓, φ∗1F ↓, φ∗2L ↑ and φ∗2F ↑, and sequential-
input investments (starting with input 1) are more likely for both firms. When the set of
(µI1 ,µI2 ) points are in the north-east or south-west quadrants, we conclude, respectively:
if µI1 ↓, with µI1 ∈ [0,+∞), and µI2 ↑, with µI2 ∈ [0,+∞), φ∗1L ↑, φ∗1F ↑, φ∗2L ↓
and φ∗2F ↓, and sequential-input investments (starting with input 2) are more likely for both
firms. If µI1 ↑, with µI1 ∈ (−∞, 0], and µI2 ↓, with µI2 ∈ (−∞, 0], φ∗1L ↓, φ∗1F ↓, φ∗2L ↑
and φ∗2F ↑, and sequential-input investments (starting with input 1) are more likely for both
firms.
Notice that if the set of (µI1 , µI2 ) points are in the north-west or south-east quadrants,
sequential-input investments are more likely than if these are in the south-west or north-east
quadrants. This is because, in the former cases, µI1 and µI2 have different signs which means
that the cost of one input is decreasing whereas the cost of the other input is increasing and,
therefore, sequential-input investments, starting with the input whose growth rate is positive,
are more likely. Finally, if the set of (µI1 , µI2 ) points are on the 45 degree dotted line, δ = 0,
simultaneous-input investments are more likely regardless of the relative values of µI1 and
µI2 . This is because, in these cases, the cost growth rates of the two inputs are the same
(either positive or negative).29
Proposition 5 In non-preemption duopoly SK and PK markets, ceteris paribus, an increase
in the difference between the cost growth rates of the two inputs (δ), makes both firms more
likely to invest in the two inputs sequentially. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
29 Notice that δ = µI1 − µI2 and, for instance, if: (i) µI1 = 0.05 and µI2 = 0.05 or µI1 = − 0.05 and
µI2 = − 0.05, δ = 0; (ii) if µI1 = − 0.05 and µI2 = −0.10, δ = 0.05—south-west quadrant; (iii) if
µI1 = − 0.05 and µI2 = 0.10, δ = −0.15—south-west quadrant; (iv) if µI1 = 0.05 and µI2 = 0.10,
δ = − 0.05—north-west quadrant; (v) if µI1 = 0.05 and µI2 = −0.10, δ = 0.15—north-west quadrant.
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Corollary 5.1 For an inactive leader (follower), ceteris paribus, if there is a +0µI1 and a−0µI2 so µI12 is kept unchanged, φ∗1L ↓ (φ∗1F ↓), φ∗2L ↑ (φ∗2F ↑ ) and φ∗12L (φ∗12F ) is kept
unchanged—and sequential-input investments, starting with input 1, are more likely for both
firms. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Corollary 5.2 For an inactive leader (follower), ceteris paribus, if there is a −0µI1 and a+0µI2 so µI12 is kept unchanged, φ∗1L ↑ (φ∗1F ↑), φ∗2L ↓ (φ∗2F ↓) and φ∗12L (φ∗12F ) is kept
unchanged—and sequential-input investments, starting with input 2, are more likely for both
firms. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Corollary 5.3 For an inactive leader (follower), ceteris paribus, if there is a +0µI1 and a−0µI2 so as there is a +0µI12 , φ∗1L ↓ (φ∗1F ↓), φ∗2L ↑ (φ∗2F ↑) and φ∗12L ↓ (φ∗12F ↓), and
both sequential-input investments starting with input 1 and simultaneous-input investments
are possible, with the predominant investment behavior dependent on the (ex-ante) relative
values of µI1 and µI12 and (ex-ante) how far away φ1(t) and φ12(t) are from φ∗1L (t) and
φ∗12L (t), respectively. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Notice that, although in general the quadrant where the set of (µI1 , µI2 ) points is located
determine to some extent firms behavior (sequential-input or simultaneous-input invest-
ments), in all quadrants the thresholds of the leader and the follower have different sensitivities
to changes in the input cost growth rates, as shown in Sect. 3.
4.1.2 Input complementarity
As shown in Sect. 3, the complementarity between the two inputs plays a very important role
in firms’ behavior. Below we discuss with further detail some of the results of Sect. 3.
Proposition 6 For the SK and PK markets, ceteris paribus: (i) an increase in ξ accelerates
the investments of the leader and the follower in the two inputs at the same time and the
investments of both firms in input 2 if active with input 1; (ii) for investments in the two inputs
at the same time, the sensitivity of the threshold of the follower to changes in ξ is greater
than that of the leader. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Corollary 6.1 As γ12 → 0: (i) the follower tends to delay forever the investment in input
2 if he is active with input 1; (ii) both firms tend to delay forever the investment in the two
inputs at the same time. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Corollary 6.2 As γ12 → 1: (i) the leader behaves as if she was in a monopoly regarding the
investment in the two inputs at the same time; (ii) when the two firms are active with the two
inputs and their market shares are symmetric (D12L 12F = D12F 12L = 0.5), the threshold of
the follower to invest in the two inputs at the same time is twice that of the leader. Proof: See
“Appendix B”.
Corollary 6.3 (i) As γ1(γ2) → 0, the leader tends to delay forever her investment in input
1(2); (ii) as γ1(γ2) → 1 the leader tends to behave as if she was in a monopoly regarding
her first-stage investment in input 1(2); (iii) an increase in γ1(γ2) accelerates the follower’s
first-stage investment in input 1(2) and delays the follower’s second-stage investment in input
2 (1). Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Proposition 7 (i) For the SK and PK markets where the leader is active with input 1 (input
2), an increase in γ12 accelerates the investment in input 2 (input 1); (ii) when the leader is
active with input 1 (input 2), the threshold to invest in input 2 (input 1) is more sensitive to
changes in γ12 if the leader is in a SK market. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
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Proposition 8 (i) For the SK and PK markets where the leader is active with input 1 (input
2), an increase in γ1(γ2) accelerates the second-stage investment in input 2 (input 1); (ii)
when the leader is active with input 1 (input 2) the threshold to invest in input 2 (input 1) is
more sensitive to changes in γ1(γ2) if the leader is in a SK market. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Proposition 9 (i) For the SK and PK markets where the leader is inactive, an increase in
γ1(γ2) accelerates her first-stage investment in input 1 (input 2); (ii) if the leader is inactive,
her threshold to invest in input 1 (input 2) is more sensitive to changes in γ1(γ2) if in a PK
market. Proof: See “Appendix B”.
Table 6 below provides further illustrative results regarding our model.
The results above show that, for both firms and the SK and PK markets, in sequential-input
investments, the thresholds to invest in input 2 if active with input 1 (φ∗1+2L and φ∗1+2F )
are higher than the thresholds to invest in input 1 if active with input 2 (φ∗2+1L and φ∗2+1F ).
This occurs because we assume in our base parameters that the cost of input 1 decreases
more slowly than the cost of input 2 (µI1 = − 0.05 and µI1 = − 0.10). Furthermore, in
sequential-input investments, the timing of the first-stage investment of the leader is the
same for both markets, but the leader invests earlier in the second-stage if in a PK market
and the follower invests earlier in the first-stage if in a SK market. The above results also
support Propositions 3 and 4.
4.1.3 Competition factor
We show that when competition is taken into account, the conventional wisdom described
above does not necessarily hold, particularly for the follower. This investment behavior of
the follower is more likely when the competition asymmetry (in terms of market shares)
between the two firms is high (Fig. 4, right-hand side). Thus, we conclude that competition
has a negligible effect on the leader’s behavior and affects significantly the timing of the
follower’s investment in the two inputs at the same time.
Regarding the first-stage of the sequential input-investments, we find that the leader’s
threshold is not affected by its market share, whereas the follower’s threshold increases
with the leader’s market share for both the SK and PK markets (see, respectively, Fig. 6,
right-hand side, and Fig. 11 at the bottom). With respect to the second-stage of sequential
input-investments, there is a more diverse set of investment behavior for both firms if in a SK
market. The leader delays the investment in the second input as D1L 1F increases, whereas
the follower’s threshold is not affected by changes in D1L 1F (see Fig. 8, right-hand side).
In addition, both firms invest earlier in the second-input if D12L 1F increases (see Fig. 9,
left-hand side), the follower delays the investment in the second input if D12L 12F increases,
and the leader’s threshold is not affected by changes in D12L 12F (see Fig. 9, right-hand side).
Furthermore, we also conclude that:
Proposition 10 For the SK and PK markets where the leader is active with the two inputs,
ceteris paribus: (i) if the follower is inactive, an increase in D12F 12L , accelerates the invest-
ment in the two inputs at the same time; (ii) if the follower is active with input 1(2), an
increase in D1F 12L (D2F 12L ), accelerates the second-stage investment in input 2(1); (iii) if
the follower is active with input 1(2), D12F 12L , accelerates the second-stage investment in
input 2(1). Proof: See “Appendix B”.
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5 Conclusions
We study the combined effect of uncertainty and competition on the timing optimization of
investments in complementary inputs, for a leader–follower non-preemption duopoly market
where both revenue and input costs are uncertain, and either spillover-knowledge is allowed
or proprietary-knowledge holds. We develop a multi-factor real option game model where,
ex-ante, the two firms hold the option to invest in input 1 alone, input 2 alone, or input 1 and
2 at the same time.
Our results show that, for both firms, the threshold to invest in the two inputs at the same
time is significantly affected by the degree of complementarity between the two inputs (Fig. 3,
right-hand side) and the input cost growth rates (Fig. 4, left-hand side). Also, the leader’s
market share when both firms are active with the two inputs has no effect on the timing of the
investment of the leader and affects significantly the timing of the investment of the follower
(the higher the leader’s market share, the later the follower invests), see Fig. 4, right-hand
side. Thus, we conclude that when we mix revenue and input costs uncertainty with duopoly
competition, the two firms can have very distinct behavior regarding the investment in the
two inputs at the same time.
Notice that our model setting is for a non-preemption game, thus the leader invests at the
same time as a monopolist, and gets 100% of the market while active alone, regardless of
which input she adopts. Therefore, competition (i.e., how the ex-post market share is divided
between the two firms when both are active) does not affect the leader’s threshold to invest
in the two inputs at the same time, but it influences significantly the timing of the follower’s
investment. The more asymmetric is the ex-post market share between the two firms, favoring
the leader, the later the follower invests, which implies that asynchronous input-investments
are more likely.
Smith (2005) shows that input cost uncertainty makes a monopolistic firm less likely
to follow the conventional wisdom regarding the investment in two complementary inputs.
From our results we conclude that the leader is more prone to behave according to what
is suggested by the conventional wisdom, synchronous input-investments are more likely,
and the follower is more prone to behave according to what is advised for the monopolistic
firm of Smith (2005), asynchronous input-investments are more likely (see Fig. 13 in the
“Appendix C”). However, our findings also show that revenue market share competition
reinforces an asynchronous input-investment behaviour for the follower, who is more likely
than the monopolistic firm of Smith (2005) to invest in the two inputs sequentially.
The above behaviour is somewhat surprising, because in a leader–follower investment
game as soon as the leader invests the follower is like a monopolist. Nevertheless, because
the follower is exposed to competition, and the more asymmetric is the ex-post market
share between the two firms, favoring the leader, the later the follower invests, which makes
synchronous input-investments less likely.
We also show that asymmetric changes in the cost growth rates of the two inputs accelerate
the investment in the input whose cost growth rate change is positive, deters the investment in
the input whose cost growth rate is negative, and may not affect the timing of the investment
in the two inputs at the same time (Figs. 4 and 6, left-hand side, and Table 5). Also, for both
firms, we find that an increase in the degree of complementarity between the two inputs,
enhances the investment in the two inputs at the same time, if the firm is inactive, and the
investment in the second input if the firm is active with one input (see, respectively, Fig. 3,
right-hand side, Fig. 8, left-hand side, and Fig. 11, right-hand side). Finally, we conclude that,
for simultaneous-input investments, the sensitivity of the follower’s investment threshold to
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changes in the degree of complementarity is slightly greater than that of the leader (Fig. 3,
right-hand side), dependent on the input growth rate differentials (Table 4).
By taking advantage of the natural homogeneity of degree one of our investment problem
(regarding PDE 11) and the use of other standard real option modelling assumptions, we arrive
at analytical solutions for both the firms’ value and the investment thresholds, for several
realistic investment scenarios, which make a very complex (three-dimensional) multi-factor
real option game model analysis tractable.
This research can be extended in several ways. For instance, it would be interesting to
consider markets where pre-emption is allowed, or there is a second-mover advantage, or the
degree of complementarity between the investment inputs and the ex-post market shares is
stochastic.
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Appendix A
1 Proof of homogeneity of degree-one
If the value-matching relationship can be expressed as the equality between the option
value denoted by FF,SK12 (X¯ , I¯2) and the difference between the two functions, f F,SK2 (X¯)
and f F,SK3 ( I¯2), representing the net value generated from exercising the option, where the
vectors X¯ and I¯2, of size n and m respectively are defined by X¯ = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} and
I¯2 = {I 12 , I 22 , . . . , I m2 }, then Euler’s theorem on homogenous functions applies (see Sydsaeter
and Hammond 2006). The value matching relationship is:
FF,SK12
(
X¯ , I¯2
) = f F,SK2 (X¯)− f F,SK3 ( I¯2)
The associated smooth pasting conditions are:
∂FF,SK12
∂Xi
= ∂ f
F,SK
2
∂Xi
∀i
∂FF,SK12
∂ I2 j
= −∂ f
F,SK
3
∂ I2 j
∀ j
These conditions imply:
n∑
i=1
Xi
∂FF,SK12
∂Xi
+
m∑
j=1
I2 j
∂FF,SK12
∂ I2 j
=
n∑
i=1
Xi
∂ f F,SK2
∂Xi
−
m∑
j=1
I2 j
∂ f F,SK3
∂ I2 j
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If the two functions, f SK2 (X¯) and f SK3 ( I¯2), possess the homogeneity of degree-one property,
then by Euler’s theorem:
n∑
i=1
Xi
∂FF,SK12
∂Xi
+
m∑
j=1
I j
∂FF,SK12
∂ I2 j
= f F,SK2 − f F,SK3 = FF,SK12
which implies that FF,SK12 is a homogenous function of degree one. The assertion that the
option value is represented by a homogenous degree-one function can be tested by the value
matching relationship and its associated smooth pasting conditions. Examining the value
“matching conditions” we can easily prove that homogeneity exists. The value matching
condition given by Eq. (17) is reproduced here as Eq. (A.1),
FF,SK12 (X
∗, I ∗2 ) =
γ12 X∗.D12F 12L
r − µX − I
∗
2F (A.1)
If the option value is FF,SK12 (X, I2) and the value after exercising the option is
γ12 X∗.D12F 12L /(r − µX ) − I ∗2F , with both X and I2 stochastic, then if FF,SK12 (X, I2) =
γ12 X∗.D12F 12L /(r − µX ) − I ∗2F holds, doubling X∗ and I ∗2F doubles FF,SK12 (X, I2), there
is homogeneity of degree-one. If the “value matching” relationship exhibits homogeneity
of degree-one, then the two variables (X, I2) can be replaced by, in this case, the ratio
φ2 = X/I2.30
2 Derivation of ODE (12)
Rewriting Eq. (11) as (A.2):31
1
2
∂2 F12
∂X2
σ 2X X
2 + 1
2
∂2 F12
∂ I 22
σ 2I2 I
2
2 +
∂2 F12
∂X∂ I2
X I2σXσI2ρX I2 +
∂F12
∂X
µX X
+∂F12
∂ I2
µI2 I2 − r F12 = 0 (A.2)
In order to reduce the homogeneity of degree two in the underlying variables to homo-
geneity of degree one, similarity methods can be used, as in Paxson and Pinto (2005). Let
φ2 = X/I2, so:
F(X, I2) = f (X/I2) I2 = f (φ2)I2
∂F(X, I2)
∂ I2
= f (φ2)− XI2
∂ f (φ2)
∂φ2
∂F(X, I2)
∂X
= ∂ f (φ2)
∂φ2
∂2 F(X, I2)
∂ I 2
= ∂
2 f (φ2)
(∂φ)2
X2
(I2)3
∂2 F(X, I2)
∂X2
= ∂
2 f (φ2)
∂φ22
1
I2
∂2 F(X, I2)
∂X∂ I2
= −∂
2 f (φ2)
∂φ22
X
(I2)2
30 Empirical proof can be provided under request.
31 For simplicity of notation we drop the upper script on F12 and f12(φ2).
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Substituting back to Eq. (A.2) we obtain Eq. (12), rewritten here as (A.3):
1
2
σ 2m2(φ2)
2 ∂
2 f12(φ2)
∂φ22
+ (µX − µI2) (φ2)∂ f12(φ2)∂φ2 + γ1 X.D1L 1F
− (r − µI2) f12(φ2) = 0 (A.3)
where σ 2m2 = σ 2X + σ 2I2 − 2ρX I2σXσI2 .
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1 In simultaneous-input investments both firms play a “one-shot” game,
regardless of the market structure, i.e. the investment game ends for the two firms at the
moment they exercise the option to invest in the two inputs at the same time. Consequently,
firms’ value, if inactive, equals the option value to invest in the two inputs at the same time
(which is the same for the SK and PK markets), and, if active with the two inputs, equals
the present value of the cost savings from operating with the two inputs forever (which is
the same for the SK and PK markets). Therefore, conditions (29A) and (29B) are proved.
From the above rationale we also conclude that the boundary conditions used to derive the
threshold expressions are the same for the two markets. Therefore, conditions (29C) and
(29D) are also proved. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 In our framework the investment thresholds are trigger points which,
if reached the first time, justify investment, otherwise firms should defer investment. It also
results from our modelling setting that firms lose the option to invest in the two inputs at the
same time if they exercise the option to invest in one of the inputs alone (input 1 or input 2).
Consequently, if the thresholds that justify the leader and the follower investing in input 1
alone (φ∗1L (t) and φ∗1F (t) respectively) or input 2 alone (φ∗2L (t) and φ∗2F (t) respectively) are
reached before those which justify the leader and the follower investing in the two inputs at
the same time (φ∗12L (t) and φ∗12F (t) respectively), both firms should invest in the two inputs
sequentially. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 In sequential-input investments, in the terminal-state where the fol-
lower operates with input 1 and the leader operates with the two inputs, the follower plays a
“one-shot” game regarding the investment in the second input, regardless of the market struc-
ture (i.e., the game ends at the moment the follower exercises the option to invest in input
2). Therefore, the boundary conditions used to derive the follower’s threshold expression are
the same for the SK and PK markets and, if so, condition (55) is proved. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 In sequential-input investments the leader invests before the follower
in one of the inputs (input 1 or input 2), regardless of the market structure. Using the same
rationale as for the proofs of propositions 1 and 2 we prove condition (68). ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 and Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2 In order to prove proposition 5 we have
to prove that φ∗1L and φ
∗
1F decrease with δ, and/or φ
∗
12L and φ
∗
12F increase with δ. The most
obvious way to do this would be to determine the first derivative of the threshold expressions
with respect to δ (i.e., ∂φ∗ki, j /∂δ). Yet, δ is not in the threshold expressions and, therefore, this
approach is not feasible. Nevertheless, from Sect. 3 we know that, ceteris paribus: if µI1 ↑
and µI2 ↓ so as δ ↑, φ∗1L ↓, φ∗1F ↓, φ∗2L ↑ and φ∗2F ↑, both firms invest earlier in input 1 and
later in input 2, and therefore sequential-input investments (starting with input 1) are more
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likely. If µI1 ↓ and µI2 ↑ so as δ ↑, φ∗1L ↑, φ∗1F ↑, φ∗2L ↓ and φ∗2F ↓ , both firms invest earlier
in input 2 and later in input 1, and therefore sequential-input investments (starting with input
2) are more likely. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Corollary 5.3 Following the rationale used above for the proof of corollaries 5.1
and 5.2, we conclude that when simultaneous changes in the cost growth rates of the two
inputs lead to a decrease in the threshold to invest in one input alone (input 1 or input 2) and
the threshold to invest in the two inputs at the same time, both sequential-input investments
and simultaneous-input investments are likely. It is not possible to determine the predominant
investment behavior, since the thresholds to invest in input 1 alone, input 2 alone, and inputs
1 and 2 at the same time, decrease. The occurrence of sequential-input or simultaneous-input
investments depends on the relative values of the thresholds, the size of the changes in µI1 ,
µI2 and µI12 , and (ex-ante) how far away φ1(t), φ2(t) and φ12(t) are from φ∗1L (t), φ∗2L (t) and
φ∗12L (t), respectively. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 Proposition 1 shows that φ∗SK12L = φ∗PK12L ≡ φ∗SK&PK12L and φ∗SK12F =
φ∗PK12F ≡ φ∗SK&PK12F . To study the relationship between ξ and the above thresholds we determine
the first derivative of φ∗SK&PK12L and φ
∗SK&PK
12F with respect to ξ—see Eqs. (20) and (29). Yet,
ξ is not in the above threshold expressions, and so we use the first derivatives of (29) and
(20) with respect to the complementarity-related parameter(s) that belongs to the threshold
expression (γ12):
∂φ∗SK&PK12L
∂γ12
= − η1(r−µX )
(
η1 D12L 0F−D12L 0F
)(
η1γ12 D12L 0F−γ12 D12L 0F
)2 < 0 (B.1)
∂φ∗SK&PK12F
∂γ12
= − η1(r−µX )(η1−1)D12F 12L[
(η1−1)γ12 D12F 12L
]2 < 0 (B.2)
∂φ∗SK&SP1+2F
∂γ12
= −
[
ψ1(µX−r)−ψ1φ1γ1 D1F 12L
][
D12F 12L (1−ψ1)
][
γ12 D12F 12L (1−ψ1)
]2 < 0 (B.3)
∂φ∗SK&SP1+2L
∂γ12
= − φ1ν1γ1 D12L 0F
γ12 D12F 0L (ν−1)2
< 0 (B.4)
B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 are all negative, therefore (i) is proved. To prove (ii) we have
to show that
∂φ∗SK&PK12L /∂ξ
∂φ∗SK&PK12F /∂ξ
= 0 < 1, ∀γ12. Using the above expression and simplifying,
yields:0 = (η1 D12L 0F−D12L 0F )(η1−1)γ 212 D12F 12L
(η1γ12 D12L 0F−γ12 D12L 0F )2
, with γ12 ∈ (0, 1). Taking the limits we get:
Limγ12→0 0 = 0 and Limγ12→1 0 = η1 D12F 12L−D12F 12Lη1 D12L 0F−D12L 0F . Since D12L 0F = 1 and D12F 12L ∈
(0, 0.5], 0 < 1, ∀γ12. Therefore (ii) is proved. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Corollary 6.1 γ12 ∈ (0, 1), Limγ12→0 φ∗SK&PK1+2F = ∞ and Limγ12→0 φ∗SK&PK12L =∞, therefore, corollary 6.1 is proved. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Corollary 6.2 γ12 ∈ (0, 1), Limγ12→1 φ∗SK&PK12L = η1(r−µX )η1−1 , Limγ12→1 φ∗SK&PK12F
= η1(r−µX )(η1−1)D12F 12L . Notice that η1(r − µX )/(η1 − 1) is the threshold mark-up normalized by
the investment cost for a monopoly market, therefore (i) is proved. The follower’s threshold
differs from that of the leader by a factor: 1/D12F 12L . Notice that D12F 12L ∈ (0, 0.5] and
if the ex-post market shares of the two firms are symmetric, D12F 12L = 0.5. Replacing
D12F 12L in the above expression by 0.5, we conclude that the Limγ12→1 φ∗SK&PK12F is twice
the Limγ12→1 φ∗SK&PK12L . Therefore (ii) is proved. ⊓unionsq
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Proof of Corollary 6.3 note that γ1 ∈ (0, 1) and Limγ1→0 φ∗SK&PK1L = ∞, therefore (i) is
proved; Limγ1→1 φ∗SK&PK1L = β1(r−µX )β1−1 and corresponds to the threshold mark-up normal-
ized by the investment cost for a monopoly market, therefore (ii) is proved; to prove (iii)
we need to prove that the first derivatives of φ∗SK&PK1L and φ
∗SK&PK
1+2F with respect to γ1 are
negative and positive, respectively, which we show below. Therefore (iii) is also proved.
∂φ∗SK&PK1L
∂γ1
= −β1(r − µX )
(
β1 D1L 0F − D1L 0F
)(
β1γ1 D1L 0F − γ1 D1L 0F
)2 < 0 (B.5)
∂φ∗SK&SP1+2F
∂γ1
= − ψ1φ1 D1F 12L
γ12 D12F 12L (1− ψ1)
> 0 (B.6)
⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 to prove (i) we need to show that the first derivatives of φ∗SK1+2L and
φ∗PK1+2L with respect γ12 are negative, which is shown by (B.7) and (B.8) below. Therefore (i)
is proved.
∂φ∗SK1+2L
∂γ12
= −φ1ψ1γ1 D1L 1F + ψ1(r − µX )+ D12L 0F (ψ1 − 1)[
γ12 D12L 0F (ψ1 − 1)
]2 < 0 (B.7)
∂φ∗PK1+2L
∂γ12
= −φ1υ1γ1 D1L 0F + υ1(r − µX )+ D12L 0F (υ1 − 1)[
γ12 D12L 0F (υ1 − 1)
]2 < 0 (B.8)
To prove (ii) we need to compare (B.7) with (B.8) and show that ∂φ
∗PK
1+2L
∂γ12
>
∂φ∗SK1+2L
∂γ12
,∀γ12, or
that
∂φ∗PK1+2L
∂γ12
/
∂φ∗SK1+2L
∂γ12
= 2 < 1,∀γ12. Replacing the terms of this inequality by their respective
expressions and simplifying yields: (υ1−1)
2φ1ψ1γ1 D1L 1F +(υ1−1)2ψ1(r−µX )+(υ1−1)2 D12L 0F (ψ1−1)
(ψ1−1)2φ1υ1γ1 D1L 0F +(ψ1−1)2υ1(r−µX )+(ψ1−1)2 D12L 0F (υ1−1)= 2. If the market conditions (revenue volatility, input cost volatility, etc) are the same for the
SK and PK markets, ψ1 = υ1, the above expression yields:
φ1ψ1γ1 D1L 1F +ψ1(r−µX )+D12L 0F (ψ1−1)
φ1ψ1γ1 D1L 0F +ψ1(r−µX )+D12L 0F (ψ1−1) = 2. Since D1L 1F < D12L 0F and γ12 ∈ (0, 1), 2 < 1,∀γ12. Therefore, (ii) is also proved. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8 To prove (i) we need to show that the first derivative of φ∗SK1+2L and
φ∗PK1+2L with respect to γ1 is negative. This is shown below by (B.9) and (B.10) and therefore(i) is proved.
∂φ∗SK1+2L
∂γ1
= − φ1ψ1γ1 D1L 1F
γ12 D12L 0F (ψ1 − 1)
< 0 (B.9)
∂φ∗PK1+2L
∂γ1
= − φ1υ1 D1L 0F
γ12 D12L 0F (υ1 − 1)
< 0 (B.10)
To prove (ii) we need to compare (B.12) with (B.13) and show that ∂φ
∗PK
1+2L
∂γ1
>
∂φ∗SK1+2L
∂γ1
,∀γ1,
or that
∂φ∗PK1+2L
∂γ1
/
∂φ∗SK1+2L
∂γ1
= 3 < 1,∀γ1. Replacing the terms of the inequality by the respective
expressions and proceeding as for proposition 7 (i.e., ψ1 = υ1 if the same market conditions
hold for the SK and PK markets) we obtain: γ1 D1L 1FD1L 0F = 3. Since D1L 0F > D1L 1F and
γ1 ∈ (0, 1), 3 < 1,∀γ1, therefore (ii) is proved. ⊓unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 9 To prove (i) we need to show that the first derivatives of φ∗SK1+2L and
φ∗PK1+2L with respect to γ1 are negative. This is shown below by (B.14) and (B.15), therefore(i) is proved.
∂φ∗SK1F
∂γ1
= −β1(r − µX ) (β1 − 1) D1F 1L[
(β1 − 1)γ1 D1F 1L
]2 < 0 (B.11)
∂φ∗PK1F
∂γ1
= −λ1(r − µX ) (λ1 − 1) D1F 12L[
(λ1 − 1)γ1 D1F 12L
]2 < 0 (B.12)
To prove (ii) we need to compare (B.11) with (B.12) and show that ∂φ
∗PK
1F
∂γ1
>
∂φ∗SK1F
∂γ1
,∀γ1,
or that
∂φ∗PK1F
∂γ1
/
∂φ∗SK1F
∂γ1
= ϒ < 1,∀γ1. Replacing the terms of the inequality by the respective
expressions and proceeding as for propositions 7 and 8 (i.e., β1 = λ1 if the same market
conditions hold for the SK and PK markets) we obtain: D1F 1LD1F 12L = ϒ . Since D1L 1F > D1F 12L ,
ϒ > 1, and therefore (ii) is proved. ⊓unionsq
Proof of Proposition 10 D12F 12L is the follower’s market share when both firms are active
with the two inputs and D1F 12L is the follower’s market share if active with input 1 and
the leader is active with the two inputs. To prove (i) and (ii) we need to show that the first
derivative ofφ∗SK&PK12F with respect to D12F 12L and the first derivative ofφ
∗SK&SP
1+2F with respect
to D1F 12L , respectively, are negative. This is shown by (B.13) and (B.14). Therefore (i) and
(ii) are proved. To prove (iii) we need to show that the first derivative of φ∗SK&SP1+2F with respect
to D12F 12L is negative. This is shown by (B.14) and therefore (iii) is also proved.
∂φ∗SK&PK12F
∂D12F 12L
= −η1(r − µX )(η1 − 1)γ12[
(η1 − 1)γ12 D12F 12L
]2 < 0 (B.13)
∂φ∗SK&SP1+2F
∂D1F 12L
= −ψ1φ1 D1F 12L[
γ12 D12F 12L (1− ψ1)
]2 < 0 (B.14)
∂φ∗SK&SP1+2F
∂D12F 12L
= −
[
ψ1(µX − r)− ψ1φ1γ1 D1F 12L
]
γ12(1− ψ1)[
γ12 D12F 12L (1− ψ1)
]2 < 0 (B.15)
⊓unionsq
Appendix C
See Fig. 13.
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Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995), 
Colombo and Mosconi (1995)
Monopolist Firm without Uncertainty:
conventional wisdom is likely to hold (investments 
in the two inputs at the same time are more likely)
Smith (2005)
Monopolist Firm with Uncertainty:
conventional wisdom does not necessarily 
hold (investments in the two inputs 
sequentially are likely)
Our Model
Non-Preemption Duopoly with Uncertainty: 
very distinct behaviours for the leader and the 
follower
Follower: conventional wisdom does 
not necessarily hold (sequential 
investments are more likely)
Leader: conventional wisdom is likely 
to hold (simultaneous investments are 
more likely)
Fig. 13 This figure contextualizes one of our main findings within the available investment literature
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